ILPC 2026

Researchers have begun to examine some of the political and economic determinants of environmental performance, including forms of governance and presence of green parties. This paper examines one particular institution that has received surprisingly little attention in empirical research despite its inherent connection to economic activity and political activism—labor unions. In particular, we explore three hypotheses about the possible effect of unions on the environment. Interest group theory suggests that unions will have a detrimental effect on environmental performance by resisting technological change in order to protect their members’ jobs. Corporatist theory suggests that when unions have a voice in governance they are able to negotiate policies that both protect the environment and the livelihoods of their members. Green unions theory suggests that unions have long fought for health and safety standards to protect workers in their workplace and in their communities, thus having a net positive effect on environmental performance regardless of participation in corporatist governance. To test these theories we utilize three different measures of union strength and examine their relationship to levels of greenhouse gas emissions per capita among 18 affluent capitalist democracies between the years of 1985-2010. In sum, we find some support for each theory. Specifically, strong employment protection laws are associated with higher levels of emissions; union participation in corporatist governance is associated with reduced levels of emissions; and high levels of union density are related to lower levels of emissions, net of employment protection laws and corporatist governance.