ILPC 2026

Employer associations are often viewed as a necessary – albeit not sufficient – condition for coordination between companies of terms and conditions of employment. As such, employer associations have historically constituted a bulwark against fragmentation of work for their member companies. But what happens when employer associations themselves are fragmented along cleavage lines between companies? This paper investigates the relationship between employer associations and conditions for workers in telecommunications. Specifically, we analyse and compare the effect of different structures of employer representation on the regulation of terms and conditions in Denmark and Sweden. These two similar egalitarian countries with long histories of strong trade unions, exhibit remarkable differences in the structures of employer representation in telecommunication. In Denmark, telecom companies are split between two competing employers associations services, DI and Dansk Erhverv, with different collective agreements. DI, however, encompasses manufacturing companies, and thus forges strong connections across telecommunications and manufacturing. Conversely, in Sweden, telecommunication companies are unified in one employer association, Almega, for the entire service sector, but this association is pitted against manufacturing employer associations. How do these different structures of representation on the employer side affect their goals, strategies and power resources? And how do employer associations seek to represent employer interests in two transforming social democracies within the EU with regards to collective bargaining and telecom regulation? Are we seeing signs convergence, i.e. that all employers – regardless of structure of employer representation – have been forced by liberalization and European integration to pursue decentralization and liberalization of the bargaining model. Or, are we seeing divergence: i.e. employer goals are different between the countries due to variation in employer association structure, strategy, and power? The study is based on company case studies of key telecommunication companies in the two countries, as well as interviews with the three employer associations. The findings show that the fragmentation of employer associations in Denmark is used strategically by companies to coerce even strong trade unions into concessionary bargaining on terms and conditions. Companies in Denmark have an exit option in the alternative employer association and they use this option when product markets squeeze. Conversely, Swedish trade unions rely on more stable bargaining relations with a single unitary employer association which has benefitted workers. Here the exit option is no employer association and this would put them in a vulnerable position given the strong trade unions in Sweden. These findings suggest that even in a highly internationalised industry like telecommunication, structures of representation still produce differences on terms and conditions across very similar countries.